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Learning from Experience: Acquisition Professional 
Education for this Century 
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Abstract 
We have been educating and training people in acquisition skills since the days of the Polaris 
missile development and the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE). More recently, the 
importance of an educated acquisition workforce was front and center in the 2019 Section 809 
panel’s findings, which recommended a new competency model for the career development of 
the acquisition workforce. The findings emphasize the necessity of gaining acquisition 
qualifications through “a combination of education, training, and practice.” This paper suggests 
three themes to consider as we look to improving weapons systems development. The first is the 
project manager (PM) and leadership team. Today, more than ever, the PM is no longer the hero; 
in fact, project success is a direct reflection of the project leadership team, not just the project 
manager. The second idea is the way we educate the acquisition workforce. Rote and classroom-
based learning was acceptable when it was the only option. Today, experiential learning offers a 
way to ensure we are imparting not just rote learning and certifications but providing our people 
the knowledge, skills, and experience to effectively control the efforts we charge them to lead. 
The third topic is focused on the mechanics of education. Using wargaming, we can create a 
learning environment that provides students experience in managing acquisition without failure. 
Introduction 
Defense programs often fall short of achieving their planned results, whether in 
capabilities or meeting planned costs or schedule. Examinations of the causes of failures over 
the past decades show a wide variety of reasons (Pickar, 2018; Tyson et al., 1989; Van Atta et 
al., 2015). The reasons range from optimism in cost and schedule estimates to technological 
challenges, and in most cases are a combination of reasons. The reaction to these failures has 
been an almost continuous wave of defense acquisition reform (Bair, 1994). In fact, we have 
been reforming the acquisition system frequently since the 1960s (Fox, 2011). The defense 
acquisition reforms range from revamping the approach to product life-cycle management to the 
periodic changes to the names of the phases of the acquisition framework. While there have 
been some successes, failures persist. The question becomes not whether we need another 
reform of the acquisition system; instead we must ask whether we are addressing the root 
causes of failures in acquisition and why programs behave in ways we do not expect (Williams, 
2005). This paper examines the current education and training system for defense acquisition 
personnel and suggests some alternatives to the current practice in education defense 
acquisition professionals.  
We have been educating and training people in project management skills (engineering 
as well, but that is beyond the argument of this paper) since the days of the Polaris missile 
development and the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE; Hughes, 1998). More 
recently, the importance of an educated acquisition workforce was front and center in the 2019 
Section 809 panel’s findings, which recommended a new competency model for the career 
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development of the acquisition workforce (Rec. 59, Section 809 panel.org). The findings 
emphasize the necessity of gaining acquisition qualifications through “a combination of 
education, training, and practice.”  
The paper has four parts. First is a discussion on the state of acquisition education and 
training. The second section considers the idea of teams in the context of project leadership and 
managing projects. The third section examines the idea of experiential learning and its 
application in the DoD acquisition learning environment. The paper concludes with a discussion 
on suggested framework to develop an optimal learning environment using collaborative 
analysis in a simulated environment. 
 
Figure 1. Acquisition Education Focus 
Acquisition Project Management Education and Training 
A necessary first step in any discussion on education and training is to explain the terms 
and how these concepts apply to the military and the acquisition worlds. At its most elemental, 
we train people to perform; we educate people to understand. It is possible to be highly 
educated and poorly trained, as well as being poorly educated and highly trained. Education is 
about theory, while training is about skills. In defense acquisition, we need to both educate 
project managers by providing the theory and the “why” we do what we do (Turner & Huemann, 
2000). We also need to train to provide the hands-on skills they need to succeed. Education 
provides context and the tools necessary to understand a situation and identify what tools are 
needed to address that situation. Training provides the skills necessary to use those tools, but 
“mastery of theory, along with mastery of practical skills of the field, is a hallmark of 
professionals” (Monteiro, Santos, & Varajão, 2016). 
Current education practices for the DoD acquisition workforce focus on traditional lecture 
and classroom exercise. Experiential learning, on the other hand, has long been recognized as 
the most effective means of acquiring professional education and skills (Hicks, 1996; Kayes, 
Kayes, & Kolb, 2016). The key difference in the suggested approach from that used by the 
Defense Acquisition University is an immersion process modeled on the proven Army Mission 
Command Training Program (MCTP). There has also been some DoD-sponsored work on 
experiential systems engineering education by Stevens Institute and others (Wade et al., 2013). 
Rote and classroom-based learning was acceptable when it was the only option. Today, the 
literature is rich with evidence that demonstrates the value of experiential learning (Hicks, 1996; 
Kayes et al., 2016). 
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Across the world, today’s project management education is driven by what has become 
the de facto standard, the Project Management Institute’s (PMI) Project Management 
Professional (PMP®) certification program. The PMP standards are based on the PMI-managed 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK), a compendium of best practices. The promise of both the PMI 
certification and the PMBOK is that following the standards will result in project success—
unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case.  
The practice of project management has become synonymous with PMP certification, 
just as the practice of defense acquisition has become synonymous with DAU certification. That 
results in people mistakenly believing the answer to the question: “‘Do you know project (or 
defense acquisition) management?’ [is] really asking whether you know how to do such things 
as create PERT/CPM networks and S-curves” (Frame, 1999). Effective project management 
requires critical thinking and reflection—skills that can’t be found in the PMBOK. While 
understanding how to build the artifacts of project management is important, it is insufficient to 
successfully develop weapons systems. 
Experiential learning—whether an apprenticeship approach modeled on the current 
German educational and training approach or, as this paper will argue, a simulation-based 
system—offers a way to ensure we are imparting not just rote learning and certifications but 
providing our people the knowledge, skills, and experience to effectively control the efforts we 
charge them to lead. We need to focus the acquisition education effort on learning project 
management rather than earning project manager qualifications. 
Project Leadership 
In the DoD acquisition culture, indeed American management culture, the focus is on the 
project manager (PM)—the individual—as the primary weapons system development decision-
maker. While it is true that regulations specify the PM is in charge, the reality of weapons 
system development is that it takes a group of individuals, a team, to gather and evaluate the 
necessary information and contribute to the decisions being made. The complexity of weapons 
system development, both technical and managerial, coupled with the limits of human 
capability, has forced people to specialize. The PM, while qualified in management, is at best an 
expert in one, maybe two disciplines. Projects depend on other experts, whether they are 
systems engineers, contracts specialists, or finance professionals. We need to recognize this 
specialization as beneficial in that we have dedicated experts in specific content areas, but that 
it also limits function because these specialists can only address those issues in their specific 
area, including that of the PM. In this case, the whole (knowledge of the experts) is really 
greater than the sum of the parts (individuals). 
Recent academic studies of project management point to the fact that the traditional 
project management model (PM-centric) has been often augmented by self-managed project 
teams (Frame, 2002; Godé-Sanchez, 2010; Loufrani-Fedida & Missonier, 2015; Melkonian & 
Picq, 2010). These studies further describe the project management decision process as a team 
effort, collaborative and inclusive. We need to acknowledge what most practitioners already 
know—that it takes a team led by a PM to effectively oversee today’s complex acquisitions. The 
PM is no longer the “hero” that makes the development successful, because project success 
requires a balanced team of domain experts—not just the project manager (Loufrani-Fedida & 
Missonier, 2015). We also need to acknowledge that, to be effective, teams require education 
and training not only on individual skills but collective skills as well and that collective training 
must be done with those members that will actually work together. Interestingly, many of these 
studies actually cite military operations and procedures to draw their conclusions, something the 
DoD can use to its benefit (Godé-Sanchez, 2010; Melkonian & Picq, 2010).  
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Teams 
Teams consist of two or more individuals “who have specific roles, perform 
interdependent tasks, are adaptable, and share a common goal” (Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006). 
Studies of teams across many disciplines, from medicine to construction, note that key 
individuals invariably demonstrate high individual competence. However, notwithstanding the 
trend for most technical disciplines to work in teams, the teams demonstrate, at best, mediocre 
collective competence (Melkonian & Picq, 2010). The combined efforts of these specialists 
represent the data, the knowledge, and the effort necessary to make informed project 
management decisions in the high-stakes DoD acquisition environment.  
Culturally, the military embraces teams. This has as much to do with service culture and 
doctrine as it does with the idea that the services fight as teams, whether infantry, ships, 
aircrews, or joint operations (Builder, 1989). Teams are central to the successful execution of 
military operations, both combat and acquisition. But teams must be trained to work together 
and develop the team skills necessary to accomplish their assigned tasks. Further, the ability to 
communicate rapidly and effectively with each other during missions is a prerequisite for 
effective teaming (Melkonian & Picq, 2010). The team must speak the same “language,” a 
language that is learned from working together as a team. 
Today we educate and train project managers, systems engineers, contract officers, and 
budget specialists separately. This approach is logical considering the basic educational 
principles of each of these disciplines. However, there is no educational or training environment 
to take these talented specialists and mold them into a functioning team. Further, this separation 
doesn’t allow for the necessary and critical synergy developed when individual expertise 
combines to form something that is greater than the sum of its parts (Frame, 2002).  
We need to acknowledge that it takes a team to effectively manage weapon system 
developments. Simply taking individuals, putting them together, and calling them a team (or 
making them work together on a development) is insufficient to effectively manage the 
complexity and the dollar value of the programs we are asking the DoD acquisition corps to 
manage. Certainly, no military commander would send a team to battle without first giving them 
the opportunity to train together. Similarly, no PM and team should be sent to manage the 
complex, ever-changing multimillion-dollar weapon system developments that are commonplace 
in DoD today. 
Experiential Learning 
Arguably, experiential learning—or learning from and by experiences—is a term that 
describes itself (Stellar, 2016). It is about learning from the results of individual and team 
decisions and actions—developing knowledge, skills, and expertise from doing the activities to 
be learned. In the medical field, experiential learning is a physician’s internship and in some 
cases, residency. In the military, experiential learning is a type of on-the-job training—learn 
while and by doing. It is a way to provide experience. Neuroscientists believe the experiential 
learning process is the key to learning a profession and use the training of a surgeon as an 
example (Kolb & Kolb, 2017). The surgeon learns by doing—with the help of an experienced 
surgeon. The decisions the surgeon makes, the way he or she explores the body, is a function 
of experience gained or experiential learning. Similarly, businesses educate and train their high 
performers by providing them the opportunity to experience the breadth of the business and 
learn to manage a team. At Lockheed Martin, for instance, people identified as “high potential” 
employees are selected for a broad range of positions from engineering to finance to business 
development that provide them the experience they need to learn how to make sound business 
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decisions. They learn firsthand what each member of their team does so they can more 
effectively manage when promoted to the executive ranks.  
This is how we should think about educating and training defense acquisition personnel, 
both individually and collectively. Experiential learning provides a perspective on the criticality of 
making serious managerial decisions. An experiential learning situation can provide the PM and 
team the ability to live the results of those decisions on the development of the weapons system 
without the consequences (Remington, Zolin, & Turner, 2009). The results conveyed as positive 
and negative, success and failure, on the three basic metrics of cost, schedule, and 
performance make the PM team aware of the second and third order effects of those decisions 
(Dörner, 1996). 
The development of competence in a trade or profession requires learning a mixture of 
theory, skills, and behaviors to be able to deliver consistent and desirable results (Turner & 
Huemann, 2000). For tactical training, the military services have shifted to a mix of education 
and training with capstone exercises built on practical experience. The practical experience 
comes from mock battles—physical or virtual—in the field, at sea, or in command post 
exercises. This active learning is represented in the Army, for example, by tactical unit rotations 
at the National Training Center, and for divisions and above by the Mission Command Training 
Program (MCTP) expressed as the Warfighter (WFX) exercise (Chapman, 1991). A realistic 
environment, whether real or simulated, provides participants a stressful, true-to-life 
environment and true-to-life experience preparing them for the next battle. The premise is that 
stressful, experience-focused training prepares soldiers for the next battle, and that premise has 
been tested and proven repeatedly over the past 20 years. 
We need to apply that same kind of thinking to the education and training in the 
acquisition world. While no one would directly compare fighting a ship, a brigade, or an air wing 
to managing a complex weapon system development program, there are some similarities—the 
requirements for information, the requirements for coordination, the requirements for decisions 
with resulting feedback, and the requirements of performing effectively as a team. 
Commanders, through their staffs’ direct battle activities to accomplish military missions. 
Program managers, through their staffs’ direct technology development activities to field 
capable weapons systems.  
Collaborative Analysis, Also Known as Wargaming 
The third leg of this new approach to acquisition education is a collaborative analysis 
learning technique or, more specifically, what the military calls wargaming. Collaborative 
analysis/wargaming is a broad field that ranges from engineering activities that require group 
approaches to strategic-level commercial and military actions that examine complex, high-level 
problems, like national responses to security challenges, including national approaches to 
pandemics. We define wargaming as a simulation of military or other activities involving at least 
two teams, using established rules, procedures, and human decision-making processes to 
produce learning in a defined environment. Figure 2 shows the range of collaborative analysis. 
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Wargaming is a tool to plan, train, and analyze. In the course of this analysis, 
participants work together to solve problems, which provides shared understanding. Wargames 
are events in which participants engage in a simulated environment using their own rules and 
processes to analyze, understand, and learn—resulting in a quantifiable outcome (Smith, 2010). 
Wargaming offers the participants the possibility of becoming totally immersed in a problem 
(Perla & McGrady, 2011). It enables individual and participants to learn by experiencing not only 
the stress of making decisions but by experiencing the results of their decisions, something 
actual PMs and staffs often miss because of the lag time between decisions and results 
(Dörner, 1996).  
Like any educational activity, wargaming requires preparation, a venue, and a scenario. 
The preparation is both on the organization and participant side. The wargame approach 
applies to both acquisition organizations as well as educational institutions serving the DoD 
population. On the organization side, for both educational institutions and acquisition 
organizations, preparation means identifying the learning objectives for both individuals and the 
collective.  
Recall the earlier discussion of the surgeon in training that emphasized the idea that in 
order to learn, one must be in the “operating room.” Much as a surgeon can’t learn to do surgery 
in a classroom, a PM can’t learn to manage a program in the classroom either. A surgeon in the 
operating room, or a PM in the office, is neither the only nor the most important participant. 
Wargaming, in the appropriate environment, provides learning and experience. To illustrate, in a 
letter to the new president of the Naval War College shortly after World War II, Fleet Admiral 
Chester Nimitz made this observation about his wargaming experience at the Naval War 
College:  
The war with Japan had been enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so 
many people and in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war 
was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the 
war. We had not visualized these. (as quoted in “Remarks at the Current Strategy 
Forum,” U.S. Naval War College by Dr. D. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, June 13, 2006) 
Figure 2. The Range of Collaborative Analysis 
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Realistic Environment 
Wargaming places the student in an environment, whether the Pacific Theater in World 
War II, or an ACAT 1 development program office in Washington, DC. In fact, “wargaming gives 
them palpable and powerful insights that help them prepare better for dealing with complex and 
uncertain situations in the future” (Perla & McGrady, 2011, p. 2). Placing people in varying 
situations and then discussing their decisions, the results of those decisions, and their reactions 
to those effects of those decisions is central to the learning power of wargaming (Perla & 
McGrady, 2011). Unlike a classroom, a wargame (even though an artificial construct), can be 
made as realistic as possible. A central element of this realism is stress. The military provides 
realism by replicating the fog and friction of war using the actual command post and simulating 
radio communications, intelligence reports, and enemy activities. Further, the soldiers and 
sailors that would be in the command post are present and interacting. Using proven wargaming 
practices and leveraging validated experiential learning techniques, we can create an 
acquisition environment that will provide our key acquisition leaders valuable insight into their 
own strengths and weaknesses as well as the effects of their decisions without breaking cost, 
schedule, or performance objectives.  
At its most basic, wargaming can be done in what has been called the BOGSAT (i.e., 
bunch of guys/gals sitting around a table; Perla & Markowitz, 2012). In fact, some would argue 
that wargaming is best accomplished in this manner, although there are limits to the 
effectiveness of this approach (Perla & McGrady, 2011). However, given the availability of 
technology, including networking and visualization, dedicated collaborative analysis labs can 
provide a significantly better environment than the old wargaming table. 
The practical requirement for the acquisition wargame is a collaborative analysis room 
with networked computers (Lim & Rogers, 2008). Figure 3 shows a notional laydown of a 
proposed wargaming laboratory. Each PM team member would have an individually addressed 
computer that allows communication with other team members as well as communication with 
Figure 3. Notional Acquisition Wargaming Lab 
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the control cell, which includes subject-matter experts as resources and adjudication of 
disagreements. The PM would have links to Red Cell players representing, for instance, the 
PEO, stakeholders, and the contractor PM. Similarly, team members would have links to their 
counterparts in the contractor company, as well as appropriate government contacts. The event 
is controlled by a senior mentor who acts as coordinator, master of ceremonies, and judge.  
Wargaming Weapon System Development 
The wargame, based on active-duty military training best practices, would consist of two 
phases (Offenhauer & Osborne, 2007). The first phase (Day 1) is a seminar concentrated on 
providing an environment for the PM team members to get to know their PM and each other. 
The primary goal of this first day is teambuilding, and it is led by a senior-level mentor, likely a 
retired general officer/flag officer or senior executive service. Using a prepared script, the 
mentor would guide the team through a series of acquisition problem-solving exercises. The 
team members communicate through the networked computers and by direct engagement 
among themselves (Lim & Rogers, 2008; Resta & Laferrière, 2007). Apart from these two forms 
of communication, each member has an anonymous chat capability. This allows frank 
discussion with no attribution and is useful when teams are new or consist of people relatively 
too junior to others, which might otherwise inhibit open communication. This facilitated 
environment provides an opportunity to understand each other’s strengths and weaknesses, as 
well as their perspective (Resta & Laferrière, 2007). They get to know each other and how they 
react, an essential element of success in the complex and often ambiguous world of weapon 
system development. 
The second phase (Day 2) is a simulation-supported exercise using a scenario 
developed for the PM team. The scenario is time-compressed and free-play, driven by the 
decisions made by the team. Time compressed means activities that would take months or even 
years to complete are compressed to minutes or hours. Free play means the outcomes of the 
exercise are determined by the decisions made by the PM and staff. For example, a decision to 
increase the scope of a contractual requirement is executed in a computer simulation, and the 
simulation will provide a response. That response could range from minor increases in cost and 
schedule to drastic consequences. The specifics of the simulation are not important, as it is 
transparent to the players. Instead, the ability for the PM and team to practice teamwork and 
management skills to meet the challenges of unforeseen results are tantamount.  
To provide effective learning, a robust and realistic system model is critical. System 
dynamics as a modeling tool provides the basic structure for modeling the defense acquisition 
project used in the exercise. System dynamics is useful because it builds on a basic concept of 
flows and rework and offers the modeler the opportunity to influence the rate and diversity of the 
inputs to the rework process as a primary ingredient of the simulation. Figure 4 is a simplified 
model of the rework cycle (Cooper, 1993). 
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System dynamics tracks the flow of work to be done to completed work. Theoretically, 
the planned work to be done is executed and moves to the Work Completed box. The flow of 
work, however, is not that simple, and in fact, work to be done is either not completed or is not 
completed correctly in actual development projects. This work not done or not done correctly 
becomes rework—it needs to be done again (Cooper, 1994). The influences on the model will 
be controlled by modifying the dynamic flow. Causality associated with people and productivity 
are captured by causal loops, effectively changing the variables in the model. It will take time to 
fully develop the automated simulation, but using principles of collaborative gaming, we can 
quickly establish a prototype simulation that will be a mix of automation and human controllers 
(e.g., Red Cell, etc.). The collaborative gaming environment is built on the basic wargaming 
technique familiar to most, action-reaction-counteraction.  
Scenarios 
The acquisition wargame is based upon an actual DoD acquisition program. While the 
data and history of the program provide the basis to start the wargame, the free-play aspect of 
the wargame, along with the Red Cell, allows the PM and team to take the program in the 
direction they desire. The existing program provides not only a vast amount of data from which 
to develop the simulation environment, but also allows comparison between wargame 
performance and the performance and outcome of the actual program. The PM and team make 
decisions in response to the simulation-driven events. Using the accelerated game time, the 
team is forced to deal with the results of their decisions.  
An essential element of the structure of the game is to adequately address not only the 
programmatics of the development, but the engineering, technology, contract, finance, and 
other activities that both lead to complexity and problems. As the wargame is refined over time, 
there will be separate but connected sub-models that could be also used in a stand-alone 
teaching environment, while maintaining connectivity to the basic flow of the overall effort. This 
teaching approach could be adapted for schools that teach defense acquisition, such as the 
Defense Acquisition University and the Naval Postgraduate School. For instance, systems 
engineering classes could use the stand-alone system’s engineering model execute it as 
Figure 4. Simplified System Dynamics Model Including Rework 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 10 - 
training and then take part in an overall exercise. Alternatively, students in project management 
courses and systems engineering courses could use the stand-alone modules and then interact 
throughout their coursework. This approach could also be used as a capstone exercise in a 
formal educational setting. 
Connecting the Dots 
In a military wargame, the battlefield is simulated, and the decisions made by 
commanders and their staffs are executed in the simulation. In the proposed acquisition 
wargame, the development program is simulated and executes against a scenario based on a 
historical system development. In both cases, the simulation provides both scenario and 
feedback, placing participants in “real” tactical or technology “battles.” The feedback allows 
participants to experience the results of their decisions in accelerated time. The value for the 
PM and team is the ability to experience the results of decisions that in life may have taken 
years to manifest.  
Project management is a series of connected decisions that will one day become a 
fielded weapons system. Those decisions are not made in a vacuum, nor are those decisions 
exclusively driven by the project manager. In fact, PMs lean heavily on their leadership teams to 
assist in making those decisions. This proposed acquisition education model provides an 
evolutionary mechanism to build on the excellent classroom education and training available to 
the DoD.  
No PM decides to make bad acquisition decisions; PMs and their teams make 
uninformed decisions. No PM decides to allow increased cost and schedule delays; the program 
team sometime fails to recognize the effects of their decisions. Learning through experience in a 
simulated exercise will help serving PMs and their leadership recognize what may become bad 
acquisition decisions and prevent them from occurring. An experiential learning approach to 
acquisition education using a simulation-based wargaming approach can help PMs and their 
leadership prepare for the responsibility of system development by allowing them to experience 
realistic programmatic events before they are exposed to the acquisition battlefield. 
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